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LETTING GO OF STABILITY: RESILIENCE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN*
Historic variation in the environment once served as a reliable guide to future
behavior. Sustainability promised continuity of ecological and social structures and
functions within the known envelope of historic variation. Now climate change and
other environmental stressors are tipping systems into behaviors that no longer
remain within the confines of precedent. Social-ecological systems are neither
persistent nor predicable. Letting go of stability releases us from untenable
expectations of steady maintenance of some natural order. Resistance to change will
continue to play a role as environmental law suppresses disruptions and buys time.
But resistance will eventually yield the stage to recovery and transformation.
Recovery seeks to restore some social-ecological services after a disturbance.
Transformation reorganizes systems entirely. Resilience provides a better framework
than sustainability for considering the relative merits of these management
approaches. Managing resilience as an environmental law objective will promise
less but deliver more of what it promises. Environmental law is for people
—provisioning their wants and resolving their disputes. Viewing it as a nested set of
social-ecological systems gets us away from dualist notions of nature versus society
that seldom help the environmentalist cause. Precaution will remain a defining
attribute of environmental law, but it cannot promise certainty. Static law will yield
to experimentation and moral imperatives for change. Resilient environmental law
will need to be attentive to social, as well as ecological, transformations. It will
clarify for citizens how they benefit from environmental law. This Article synthesizes
and assesses the legal scholarship on resilience. It suggests productive paths for law
reform and more equitable tools for weighing consequences of natural resource
management. Environmental law research in the coming years should explore
specific, place-based approaches to managing resilience and safe-fail designs for
adaptive governance.

*. George P. Smith, II Distinguished Professor of Law, Maurer School of Law; Indiana
University Environmental Resilience Institute. This Article benefitted from the support of the
Indiana University Grand Challenges Initiative. I dedicate this Article to George Smith, whose
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at the Indiana University Environmental Resilience Institute stimulated much of my thinking
on this topic. Special thanks to Dan Cole and Robin Craig, who changed my perspective on
resilience. Thanks also to Luis Inaraja Vera for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Michele
Wilcox-Petrites provided excellent research assistance. This Article grew from my George P.
Smith, II Distinguished Professorship inaugural lecture.
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INTRODUCTION
Anglo-American law has always resisted the unpredictability of nature. Law
facilitates modifications to the environment in order to create more favorable
conditions for reliable transportation, pollution abatement, and supplies of food and
energy. People alter the environment and then want the change to stick. The
environment pushes back and disrupts expectations of stability.
At one time, a comforting balance-of-nature paradigm promised continued, steady
ecological services.1 After learning that ecosystems do not conform to that notion,
sustainability seemed to offer a path to continue legal objectives of stability. 2 Today,
disruptive shifts in society and environmental conditions pose challenges for
environmental law as guarantor of stability. Much environmental law, especially in
the pollution control branch, seeks to avoid and remediate damage done to the
environment. Conservation legislation often promises that the last, best, untouched,
intact, or untainted places will be preserved. Both branches of environmental law
ultimately envision a final environmental condition that achieves social objectives
and then maintains them. Though all generations observe environmental variability,
the changes we observe today are qualitatively different, accelerating at historically
unprecedented rates, and unravelling ecosystems. We need new organizing
principles to reconcile social demands with ever-more dynamic natural systems.
Over the past several years, the concept of resilience has gained currency in
conservation circles for understanding our world. 3 As an organizing framework,

1. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 6–13 (1990); Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of
Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 847, 855 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 893, 894–95 (1994) (arguing that the
unpredictability and disequilibrium of nature requires a legal response that prioritizes
sustaining the large landscapes); Julianne Lutz Newton & Eric T. Freyfogle, Sustainability: A
Dissent, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 23, 28 (2005) (tracing the roots of sustainability
objectives and highlighting the challenges of applying it to ecological systems).
3. See generally MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END OF
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resilience offers the promise of improving decisions about pollution, resource
extraction, and environmental management. The property of resilience observed in
social-ecological systems does explain much of what we observe. As such, it is an
essential consideration in devising realistic priorities for what we would like
environmental law to achieve.
The ecologist Buzz Holling’s seminal article defined resilience as the ability of a
system to absorb changes yet still persist. 4 For law and other systems that include
people, resilience describes the continuity of relationships within a system.
Resilience “is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes” yet still
provide the same function, structure, and identity.5 The dynamic system “humanbike” illustrates the concept of resilience. 6 This system has two equilibrium states:
(1) the standard forward motion while riding the bike and (2) flat on the ground,
stationary. From the position of the first state, suppose the rider hits a bump. The
bike starts to wobble. If the wobble attenuates and steady forward motion resumes,
then the resilience of the system absorbed the disturbance and returned to the prior
state. Even if the forward motion does not resume in exactly the same manner, say
because the bump bent the tire in a minor fashion, the system is in a forward motion
state but may not be as productive. In that case, the bump modified the system. But
the system retains its function, structure, and identity. If the wobble amplifies and
the bike crashes to the ground, then the disturbance triggered a change into a different
equilibrium state. The greater the bump the system can absorb without causing the
rider to fall, the greater the resilience of the human-bike forward-motion state.
The social-ecological systems resilience literature explores how large an
exogenous shock—the bump in the road—the system can endure and recover its
original equilibrium. It is also about the other equilibria that the system might
transform into if subject to a great enough disturbance. The disturbance may be a
human intervention, such as a species introduction or overfishing. Or, it may be a
hurricane or an epidemic. Some systems may have more than two stable states. 7

SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE (2017); Tracy-Lynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 85 (2014).
4. C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGICAL SYS. 1, 17 (1973).
5. Marco A. Janssen & Elinor Ostrom, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptation: A
Cross-Cutting Theme of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Environmental
Change, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 237, 237 (2006); see also Brian Walker, Lance
Gunderson, Ann Kinzig, Carl Folke, Steve Carpenter & Lisen Schultz, A Handful of Heuristics
and Some Propositions for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, 11
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2006.
6. Thanks to Professor Kerry Krutilla, who described this riding-a-bike analogy to me.
He and Rafael Reuveny have explored economic approaches to modeling resilience. E.g.,
Kerry Krutilla & Rafael Reuveny, The Systems Dynamics of Endogenous Population Growth
in a Renewable Resource-Based Growth Model, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 256 (2006); Kerry
Krutilla & Rafael Reuveny, The Quality of Life in the Dynamics of Economic Development, 7
ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 23 (2002).
7. Donald Ludwig, Brian Walker & Crawford S. Holling, Sustainability, Stability, and
Resilience, 1 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 1997.
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Professor Holling promoted resilience as a way of understanding complex
ecological systems in 1973. Over the past quarter century, advances in resilience
research also applied the idea to the human behaviors and institutions that link to
changes in ecological functioning through a social-ecological systems framework.
But only in the past decade have legal scholars debated resilience’s significance for
environmental law. The resilience concept speaks to a yearning in the field of
environmental law for an organizing principle. And it describes how adaptation to
climate change may sometimes alter our environment and society while still retaining
essential functions, structures, and identity. Other times, adaptation may not succeed
in sustaining the current state of our social-ecological systems.8 Resilience objectives
upset longstanding expectations of stability and predictability.9 Reforms to law itself,
aside from the objectives environmental law seeks to achieve, may also benefit from
insights that emerge from resilient systems research. This Article reckons with all
these implications of resilience for environmental law.
Part I discusses environmental law and revives an old debate about whether the
field revolves around a central, organizing principle. Part II describes how the
resilience framework can improve environmental management. Resilience,
fundamentally, is an emergent property of systems, not a normative theory. 10 To
employ resilience in setting environmental goals, we must pour social and ethical
content into it. In other words, resilience gets us nowhere without deciding resilience
of what, to what, and for whom. Such devilish details arise in any framework we
choose. A new paradigm sounds momentous but may instead be only so much
rearranging of deck chairs.
If resilience will prompt a different way of governing our disputes over the
environment, it must respond to a key question addressed in Part III: Can resilience
provide what people demand of environmental law? Stability and predictability are
often at the core of our interests with respect to the environment. 11 For pollution, we
want ecosystems to absorb and detoxify contaminants, as rivers do for much of what
we discharge. For natural resource conservation, we want a steady flow of food, fiber,
energy, minerals, and environmental services, such as flood control. Sustainability
promised all that.12 Resilience recognizes that the environment does not always
respond the way we desire or forecast. 13 Ecosystems that have historically delivered
in a predictable fashion are increasingly failing to meet our expectations. 14 We must
therefore reshape those expectations and the systems that govern how we manage the
environment.

8. This is one reason why climate-change mitigation through reduction and removal of
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere is important.
9. Melinda Harm Benson, Reconceptualizing Environmental Challenges—Is Resilience
the New Narrative?, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 99, 116 (2015); J.B. Ruhl, General
Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications
to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 1386 (2011) (discussing stability
and predictability, respectively).
10. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1394–95.
11. See Benson, supra note 9, at 125.
12. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 2–3.
13. See id. at 116.
14. See id. at 118–19.
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Even if resilience does provide a superior framework for setting goals, we must
consider whether the design of environmental law itself needs to be more resilient.
Part IV considers whether doctrines, statutes, and regulations themselves need to be
resilient in order to promote resilient social-ecological systems (SES). Law reform
enhancing resilience of statutory and administrative activities must create a better
framework for the moral calculus of justice and participation. It also must operate in
a flexible, adaptive manner and provide avenues to work across jurisdictional
boundaries.
These sorts of questions have been around for a long time, even predating the
reform statutes of the 1970s, when environmental law emerged as a field of study.
So, in puzzling through answers, I build upon the work that has come before and
focus on how resilience is similar to or different from other ideas adopted and
discarded over the past century. Resilience is unlikely to be a flash-in-the-pan. Unlike
sustainability, it is a fundamental attribute of the world. It is also deeply embedded
in the social objectives of climate-change adaptation.15 It fundamentally addresses
the environment, but its role in environmental law is far less clear. This Article
proposes a way of thinking about resilience in environmental law rather than a
particular set of reforms. Environmental law research in the coming years should
consider specific, place-based approaches to the management of resilience and safefail designs that produce adaptive governance.
I. DOES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NEED AN OVERARCHING GOAL?
Modern environmental law grew in the late 1960s and early 70s as Congress
awoke to public discontent with the ability of courts and states to safeguard public
health and conserve the natural world.16 Even in its middle age, American
environmental law has never completely shaken its inferiority complex as a
newcomer to the repertoire of fields in legal scholarship. 17 Is it enough to say that
environmental law is about resolving disputes concerning use of public resources?
Environmental law seeks to optimize allocation but also to distribute goods and
services in an equitable fashion.18 In doing so, environmental law comprises a
hodgepodge of statutes and agency procedures, with a dash of common law property
and torts. A survey of statutory, positive environmental law may be no less coherent

15. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 4; C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience
and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 27–30 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
16. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 178–79 (2004)
(explaining that the technological and economic complexities of pollution control are beyond
the institutional competence of courts); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (attributing
the rise of federal environmental law to the failure of states to protect their citizens).
17. This perception is belied by the existence of legal decisions concerning air pollution
problems for centuries before the emergence of modern environmental law. See, e.g., PETER
BRIMBLECOMBE, THE BIG SMOKE: A HISTORY OF AIR POLLUTION IN LONDON SINCE MEDIEVAL
TIMES 9–16 (1987).
18. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 24–28.
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or structured than the standard property law class.19 But its relative youth exacerbates
the nagging doubts that environmental law is simply a grab bag of problems that
share some connection to the environment.20 If environmental law is nothing beyond
a messy compilation of statutes, rules, and cases resolving disputes over competition
for natural resources, then it is ultimately an empty vessel. Lawmakers will fill it
with the principles of ownership, tortious proximate causation, administrative and
civil procedure, as well as statutory interpretation.
Professor Tarlock grappled with the legal content of environmental law when he
asked, “Is there a there there?”21 Tarlock noted the least satisfactory response is
simply that environmental law exists, and its content is the “there.”22 Generations of
environmental law students can attest that there is no shortage of content to be
discovered by diving deep into statutory detail and regulatory morass. But, does that
content contribute anything special to the law in order to justify a category of
research? A category of law beyond just a subject of legislation requires a special set
of principles that cohere. Tarlock worried that the lack of integration of
environmental law into the older doctrines of the legal system leaves it “vulnerable
to marginalization as support for environmentalism ebbs and flows.” 23 Federal
environmental law is particularly vulnerable because, unlike the state constitutions,
the U.S. Constitution provides weak footing for environmental legislation. In an
important sense, the challenge of framing environmental law is little different from
other areas of law that emerged from problems beyond the ken of the founders, such
as antitrust or labor.24 To be a distinct field, environmental law needs a framework
to resolve disputes in a way that consistently advances a broader goal. Resilience as
an overarching theme for environmental law can help resist centrifugal tendencies of
an otherwise fragmented collection of statutes and doctrines. 25
A recent example of how the under-theorized content of environmental law can
undermine attempts to improve environmental management is Michigan v. EPA.26 In
that 2015 decision, a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court found that the agency
could not set an emission standard for hazardous air pollutants without considering
the cost to the power plants.27 The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the EPA to control

19. See James Grimmelmann, Real + Imaginary = Complex: Toward a Better Property
Course, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 930, 935 (2017).
20. A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 213, 215–16 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 215–17.
23. Id. at 217.
24. Id. at 226–28.
25. Public health and welfare are traditional frameworks for deciding on many goals of
environmental law, such as setting uniform ambient air pollution standards. 42 U.S.C. §
7409(b) (2012) (defining primary standards for public health and secondary standards for
public welfare). But those concepts offer little guidance on the process by which
environmental management can deliver on the goals. Recent research, however, connects the
effects of climate change to adverse impacts on public health. Jonathan A. Patz & Madeleine
C. Thomson, Climate Change and Health: Moving from Theory to Practice, 15 PLOS MED.,
no. 7, 2018.
26. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
27. Id. In reviewing the EPA determination, the Court interpreted a Clean Air Act
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certain pollutants if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary.” 28
Relying on the fidelity of environmental law to protecting public health, the EPA
emphasized the CAA’s goal of avoiding the injuries, morbidity, and mortality
“reasonably anticipated to occur” from the emissions. 29 Yet the majority of the
Supreme Court applied only the general principles of administrative law and
statutory construction in concluding that costs must be a part of the EPA’s
considerations in order to produce an “appropriate and necessary” rule. 30 If the
Supreme Court understood environmental law as a field advancing a central precept
of precaution, then one justice may have switched sides and the EPA would not be
considering costs in deciding whether to regulate hazardous air pollution, especially
mercury, to avoid reasonably anticipated harms to human health. Instead, cost
analysis would be deferred to the later step of deciding what kind of emission
restrictions should apply to the power plants.
Another problem with a pure positivist response to the question of what is
distinctive about the content of environmental law is that it offers little guidance on
how to reform statutes and rules. If environmental law is simply the statutes and
judicial precedent, then it would seem stubbornly resistant to adapting to new
conditions or improved understanding. 31 This positivist view may well explain the
current ossification of environmental law legislation, where infrequent amendments
generally reflect only a shift in political power rather than adaptation to new
circumstances and knowledge.32
Depending on how one circumscribes the domain of environmental law, the
strongest overarching theme is caution. 33 This essential conservatism of
environmental law developed in response to the shortcomings of common law in
responding to prospective, probabilistic harms that are often far removed in time and
space from multiple, synergetic causes. Building on the work of Professor Sax, 34
Professor Lazarus distilled the essential premise of environmental law as an
understanding that “the physical characteristics of the ecosystem generate spatial and
temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural resources far

provision relating to power plant emissions that authorizes regulatory controls if the agency
“finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
29. Id.
30. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–11.
31. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 232.
32. Victor B. Flatt, Frozen in Time: The Ossification of Environmental Statutory Change
and the Theatre of the (Administrative) Absurd, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 125–27
(2013). A recent example of an infrequent amendment may be found in the massive
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Division N—BUILD Act
(changing and clarifying federal law governing liability for hazardous waste sites in order to
promote redevelopment of abandoned industrial locations).
33. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (interpreting
Endangered Species Act as a congressional policy of “institutionalized caution” to avoid
extinctions); LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 23–24; A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental
“Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 239 (2000).
34. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971).
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beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common law tort rules.”35 The same can
be said of the social characteristics.36 Cognizant of the exorbitance or impossibility
of reversing environmental injury, environmental law generally takes a preventive
rather than a remedial stance, though there are exceptions, notably the Superfund
legislation.37 Lazarus tallied five key attributes: complexity, scientific uncertainty,
dynamism, precaution, and controversy. 38 Of those five, the first three relate to the
environment itself. Controversy relates to the politics of environmental law.
Precaution is the key attribute that defines the law itself. 39
Conservatism over safety and hesitance to transform ecological systems are
relatively new to the “internal logic” of the common law tradition.40 This may explain
the hostility of much of the current political “conservatives” to environmental law.
They rouse skepticism of the science and economics that justify wide swaths of
environmental regulation.41 Tarlock claimed that environmental law is revolutionary
in that it challenges the settled expectations that remain the primary objective of
traditional common law. “Adaptation to changed social conditions are often
subordinated to the twin values of stability and predictability.” 42 The revolutionary
project of redefining harm as long term “risk of future illness or ecosystem
malfunction rather than immediate” effects has proven slow to permeate legal
institutions outside of those subject to the explicit commands of legislation. 43
Tarlock ultimately settled on the procedural innovations of environmental law as
its greatest contribution to legal thought. Using the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)44 environmental impact analysis requirement as the paradigmatic
example, Tarlock found that environmental law is less concerned with consistent
outcomes than it is toward fidelity to process.45 Where science fails to transform legal
standards, procedure can bring rationality to bear on specific decisions. Of course,
lawyers—by training—love process. Yet, the procedural foundations of
environmental law rest upon the crumbling faith in “comprehensive rationality” as a
feasible way to account for the effects of activities that impact the environment.

35. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 121. J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman’s Climate Change,
Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010), points out that even statutory solutions often address only small
slices of a larger, complex problem with spillover effects.
36. Michael D. McGinnis & Elinor Ostrom, Social-Ecological System Framework: Initial
Changes and Continuing Challenges, 19 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2014.
37. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675).
38. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 16.
39. Precaution is also a core principle of common law torts, though it does not inevitably
take the form of a strong precautionary “principle.” Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract,
and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
40. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 222.
41. See, e.g., NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING (2010).
42. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 236.
43. Id. at 237.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012).
45. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 239–40.
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Comprehensive rationality relies on the power of foresight to accurately predict the
effects of actions.46 Adaptation to climate change and other factors leading to new
ranges of variation of environmental conditions and ecosystem phase changes will
require a new legal process, even if mitigation reduces the long-term magnitude of
the climate shifts.47 Devising a better framework for environmental decision-making
is therefore an essential task for environmental law scholarship.
II. WOULD RESILIENCE PROVIDE A USEFUL FRAMEWORK
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?
Environmental law is one element in a system of governance, which is a process
of setting goals and achieving them through social institutions. In part because of its
defensive grasping for some core principle to claim, environmental law scholarship
tends toward over-eager embrace of the latest trends. In the 1980s, sustainability (or,
“sustainable development” in the international law context)48 became a common
theme of environmental reform proposals.49 Sustainability is a helpful prompt for
identifying overexploitation of resources before they crash and for intergenerational
equity. But it is opaque when it comes to understanding sustainability of what. The
very ambiguity that allowed sustainable development to be widely hailed—that it
could be interpreted by different interests as sustaining their own needs—
undermined its usefulness.50 Sustaining business productivity, ecological services,
and social goods all at once often proves an impossible balancing act.51 Something
has to give. In practice, the short-term exigencies of economic productivity

46. See generally Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297, 299
(1999) (describing comprehensive rationality); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of
“Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 79–80 (1959) (attempts to manage public
programs with comprehensive rationality generally fail); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling,
Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 517–18 (1979) (updating and confirming his 1959
arguments).
47. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE
L.J. 975, 1018 (2013).
48. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (commonly
referred to as the “Brundtland Report” after the chair of the Commission, former Norwegian
prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland).
49. See Keith H. Hirokawa, Saving Sustainability, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,151 (2016).
50. Humby, supra note 3, at 86 (observing on Google’s “Ngram Viewer” a clear trend in
the decline of “sustainable development” relative to “resilience”). Professor Humby predicts
that resilience could suffer the same fate if the term becomes “an empty signifier.” Id. at 88.
She echoes Professor Doremus’s earlier warning that broad concepts can be used by agencies
“as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without actually imposing any
enforceable constraints on themselves.” Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental
Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001). Lynton Keith Caldwell memorably fretted that
“sustainable development” risked becoming “a thought-stopping cliché.” LYNTON KEITH
CALDWELL, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: SCIENCE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, AND POLICY
CHOICE ix (1990).
51. See Newton & Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 26.
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overshadow environmental and social aims. 52 The Trump Administration’s
objectives with respect to energy roughly translate to sustainability: that is,
sustainability of current fossil fuel energy systems to growing social concern over
the global injustice of climate change, for people who benefit from the industry and
are largely insulated from its adverse impacts.53
Sustainability assumes both that we understand what can be sustained, and that
we have the capacity to carry out what is necessary to maintain those conditions
indefinitely.54 But that assumption is not justifiable for the vast majority of socialecological systems. A term associated with the “Ostrom School” of political
science,55 “social-ecological systems” (SES) encompasses the connected social,
economic, and environmental relationships involved in such activities as farming or
managing urban stormwater.56 Professor Ostrom took the ecological resilience
concept of Holling and extended it by observing the order in the relationship between
and among the environment and the people who shape and use it. 57 She generalized
the ecological principle to describe resilience as “the amount of disruption needed to
transform a system from one stability domain (characterized by a configuration of
mutually reinforcing processes and structures) to another.”58
Social-ecological systems are complex. Rather than simplify them into sustained
outputs, resilience recognizes that dynamic conditions (and our understanding of
them) are relatively unpredictable.59 Disruptive change can occur quickly and
nonlinearly. The resilience of a system is the extent to which it can respond to
stressors and retain its essential form. 60 When systems cross critical thresholds, then
they transform into different phases.61 A familiar example is a clear lake that absorbs
nutrient inputs and purifies water. The lake’s resilience describes the stock and flow

52. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability: Can Law Meet the Challenge?, 34
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 283, 297–98 (2011) (explaining how some approaches to
sustainability merely justify existing development practices that degrade the environment).
53. See Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands Revolution:
Redefining “The Public” in Public Land Law, 48 ENVTL. L. 311, 348–66 (2018) (summarizing
the Trump Administration “energy dominance” initiatives); see also Newton & Freyfogle,
supra note 2, at 24–25 (emphasizing the importance of identifying who is doing the sustaining,
for what end, and on behalf of which beneficiaries).
54. BENSON & CRAIG supra note 3, at 4; Melinda Harm Benson & Robin Kundis Craig,
The End of Sustainability, 27 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 777, 779 (2014). Steve Carpenter,
Brian Walker, J. Marty Anderies, and Nick Abel, From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience
of What to What?, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 765 (2001), point out that, like sustainability, resilience as
a policy goal requires identification of what features are of interest (resilience of what) and
which disturbances are of concern (to what).
55. ELINOR OSTROM AND THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Daniel
Cole & Michael D. McGinnis eds., 2014–17).
56. See Elinor Ostrom & Marco A. Janssen, Multi-Level Governance and Resilience of
Social-Ecological Systems, in GLOBALISATION, POVERTY AND CONFLICT 239 (Max Spoor ed.,
2004).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 247.
59. See Holling, supra note 4, at 17.
60. Id.
61. See Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1377–78.
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of nutrients it can absorb without flipping into a eutrophic phase dominated by algae.
Once the lake transforms into a eutrophic state, it may no longer “bounce back” to
reorganize into a clear lake even if the nutrient flows abate. Humpty Dumpty is not
easily put back together. Social systems, such as banking, undergo similar resilient
behavior—the subprime mortgage business hummed along steadily until it
dramatically crashed into a completely different phase in 2008.62 As complex as our
economy or an ecosystem may be, the interactions between the two in a socialecological system complicate the picture even more.
For instance, kelp forests are highly biologically diverse, structurally complex,
and highly productive ecosystems that occur in mid-latitude, cold-water, rocky
coastal waters.63 When fishing depletes the population of top predators, herbivorous
sea urchins may proliferate and eat enough kelp to crash the ecosystem and produce
an entirely different ecological state.64 This occurred along the U.S. Pacific Coast
after sea otters largely disappeared. But, in the western North Atlantic, after the
commercial fishing industry decimated predatory fishes, especially cod, large crabs
thrived in the vacant niche and began reducing the urchin populations, keeping the
kelp forests intact.65 Such are the unpredictable, disparate outcomes of the coupled
SES. And, these examples simplify phase changes because many SES have multiple
equilibria, not just two states.66
A. The Social Dimension of Resilience
Despite the contingent uncertainty, we need an environmental law objective to
recognize that humans always alter nature and are altered by it.67 This is the essential
insight of the Ostrom institutional analysis and development framework, which
builds on the inevitable ecological context that shapes social institutions. 68 Resilience
can guide answers to the questions of how much, where, and (with its social
dimension) for whom. Sometimes sustainability and resilience objectives will
correspond to the same procedures and outcomes. For instance, the recovery and
maintenance of migratory waterfowl is among the greatest sustainability success
stories of twentieth century America.69 This management of bird populations and
hunting within a consistent band of variation was accomplished with the tool of

62. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848 (2011).
63. Robert S. Steneck, Michael H. Graham, Bruce J. Bourque, Debbie Corbett, Jon M.
Erlandson, James A. Estes & Mia J. Tegner, Kelp Forest Ecosystems: Biodiversity, Stability,
Resilience and Future, 29 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 436, 436 (2002).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Holling, supra note 4, at 19; C.S. Holling & Gary K. Meffe, Command and
Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource Management, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
328, 328 (1996); Ostrom & Janssen, supra note 56, at 247.
67. Newton & Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 28.
68. McGinnis & Ostrom, supra note 36; Ostrom & Janssen, supra note 56.
69. Byron K. Williams, Mark D. Koneff & David A. Smith, Evaluation of Waterfowl
Conservation Under the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, 63 J. WILDLIFE MGMT.
417, 419 (1999).
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adaptive management.70 But past success is no longer an indicator of the future.
Prairie potholes of the upper Great Plains, important nesting habitats for a large
proportion of migratory waterfowl, are drying up because the agricultural economy
demands more drainage and because climatic change reduces available
precipitation.71 Wintering habitat south of the United States is disappearing under
human population and economic pressures.72 Signals that trigger seasonal migrations
in many birds are no longer in sync with food sources, such as insect larvae emerging
earlier in the spring, before the birds can arrive to eat them. 73 That also may affect
the forests where more larvae consume more leaves. At the same time, in addition to
the economic drivers of farming practices in the upper Great Plains and Latin
America, migratory bird hunting has been declining in the United States over the past
forty years.74 That trend results in less habitat-conservation funding generated
through mandatory “duck stamps” that the hunters must purchase and affix to their
hunting licenses. Some North American bird migrations may well be an example of
a social-ecological system nearing a resilience limit.
System resilience is not always good or bad from the point of view of social
goals.75 Most people would say that we should try to maintain North American bird
migration in its current state by enhancing resilience to change through such practices
as better water management in the upper Great Plains.76 But, the organizing principle

70. See James D. Nichols, Fred A. Johnson & Byron K. Williams, Managing North
American Waterfowl in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 177
(1995); James D. Nichols, Michael C. Runge, Fred A. Johnson & Byron K. Williams, Adaptive
Harvest Management of North American Waterfowl Populations: A Brief History and Future
Prospects, 148 J. ORNITHOLOGY S343 (2007).
71. Greg M. Forcey, Wayne E. Thogmartin, George M. Linz, William J. Bleier & Patrick
C. McKann, Land Use and Climate Influences on Waterbirds in the Prairie Potholes, 38 J.
BIOGEOGRAPHY 1694, 1695 (2011); W. Carter Johnson, Bruce V. Millett, Tagir Gilmanov,
Richard A. Voldseth, Glenn R. Guntenspergen & David E. Naugle, Vulnerability of Northern
Prairie Wetlands to Climate Change, 55 BIOSCIENCE 863, 863 (2005); Neal D. Niemuth,
Kathleen K. Fleming & Ronald E. Reynolds, Waterfowl Conservation in the US Prairie
Pothole Region: Confronting the Complexities of Climate Change, 9 PLOS ONE, no. 6, 2014,
at 1. Climate-change effects are likely to rival land-use changes as the primary threats to
vertebrate biodiversity over the coming century. Tim Newbold, Future Effects of Climate and
Land-Use Change on Terrestrial Vertebrate Community Diversity Under Different Scenarios,
285 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B, no. 1881, 2018, at 1.
72. See DAVID S. WILCOVE, NO WAY HOME: THE DECLINE OF THE WORLD’S GREAT
ANIMAL MIGRATIONS 30−32 (2008).
73. Id. at 44–46.
74. Paul Wait, Looming Crisis: Falling Waterfowl Hunter Numbers Threaten the Future
of Hunting and Conservation, DELTA WATERFOWL, Spring 2017, at 44, 46,
https://deltawaterfowl.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/LoomingCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XNV6-CJTP]; see also Scott Yaich, Ducks 2050, DUCKS UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org
/conservation/national/ducks-2050 [https://perma.cc/4BZ6-HSQJ] (projecting from current
trends a decline in waterfowl hunters from 1.2 million in 2007 to 800,000 in 2050); U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED
RECREATION, 34, 117 tbl. C-4 (2018) (documenting waterfowl hunter numbers).
75. Benson & Craig, supra note 54, at 780.
76. See, e.g., Forcey et al., supra note 71; Lisa G. Sorenson, Richard Goldberg, Terry L.
Root & Michael G. Anderson, Potential Effects of Global Warming on Waterfowl Populations
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of resilience may lead us to social choices that push other systems across phasechange boundaries. For resilience is not always associated with health or with an
environment that functions in a way that benefits us. “Pathologically resilient”
systems can trap management with institutions resistant to change but unable to
withstand change.77 The doomed Everglades provides one example where a resilient
web of water governance institutions thwarts the kind of adaptive change necessary
to maintain the unique ecosystem.78 Yet, the traps of pathological resilience can yield
to transformation. A legal objective may sometimes promote not the strengthening
of resistance to change but instead an action to transform a system into another
state.79
For instance, Pleasant Run is a twenty-seven mile-long waterway in Indianapolis
that lost ecological functions over the past century of development. 80 Urban
infrastructure and impermeable surfaces currently provide relatively few ecological
and social services to relatively poor residents. 81 One legitimate way of thinking
about a goal for the Pleasant Run SES is to nudge it into a new bounded-equilibrium
state that better serves the people in the area and downstream. Indeed, one reason
why funding is available for altering the system is that federal law mandates
Indianapolis abate stormwater pollution and slow the ever-increasing surges of raw
sewage runoff into the White River after even normal rainfall events. 82 Most debates
about applying resilience as a legal objective arise in the preservationist context of
enhancing resilience and keeping systems within the limits to avoid disruptive

Breeding in the Northern Great Plains, 40 CLIMATIC CHANGE 343 (1998).
77. Melinda Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Can We Manage for Resilience? The
Integration of Resilience Thinking into Natural Resource Management in the United States,
48 ENVTL. MGMT. 392, 394 (2011).
78. See Lance H. Gunderson, Ahjond Garmestani, Keith W. Rizzardi, J.B. Ruhl & Alfred
Light, Escaping a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in
the Everglades Social Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (2014), for a discussion of
how ecosystems and social institutions continued to change in interaction with each other in a
manner that illustrated Holling’s “rigidity trap.” Holling, supra note 4.
79. Benson and Craig call this “intentional transformation.” BENSON & CRAIG, supra note
3, at 67. On managing complex systems for resilience-related objectives, see generally
PRINCIPLES FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN SOCIALECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Reinette Biggs, Maja Schlüter & Michael L. Schoon eds., 2015);
BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE PRACTICE: BUILDING CAPACITY TO ABSORB
DISTURBANCE AND MAINTAIN FUNCTION (2012).
80. Pleasant Run Stream Corridor Naturalization, IND. U.-PURDUE U. CTR. FOR EARTH &
EVNTL. SCI., https://cees.iupui.edu/restoration/pleasant-run [https://perma.cc/D8QH-6B5S].
81. See Simon Farrugia, Malcolm D. Hudson & Lindsay McCulloch, An Evaluation of
Flood Control and Urban Cooling Ecosystem Services Delivered by Urban Green
Infrastructure, 9 INT’L J. BIODIVERSITY SCI., ECOSYSTEM SERVS. & MGMT. 136 (2013)
(discussing the effects of impermeable surfaces on local, riparian ecological and social service
production).
82. See FRIENDS OF PLEASANT RUN, PLEASANT RUN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PLAN 59
(2011), https://www.in.gov/idem/nps/files/wmp_pleasantrun.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JSN
-JNGK]; INDIANA DEP’T. ENVTL. MGMT., PLEASANT RUN AND BEAN CREEK TMDL STUDY
(2003), https://www.in.gov/idem/nps/files/tmdl_plrun.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBV7-TXHG].
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transformation.83 But Pleasant Run shows that resilience is equally helpful in framing
a legal system that facilitates transformations to new conditions that better serve
people. Cities will be the testing grounds for transformative management that aims
to shift the role of waterways from hidden pipes or open sewers to community
gathering grounds that provide a diversity of goods and services. To the extent
compliance with the Clean Water Act motivates these urban watershed experiments
in governance, it is an example of a static environmental law pushing for dynamic
phase changes to SES.
Whether the socially constructed aim is enhancing resilience to resist regime
change or pushing a system into a new phase, the process of environmental
management is the same. This is an important point because, in practice,
conservation often focuses solely on resisting the transformative effects of change
even when transformation seems inevitable, such as in the context of the threat to
coastal wetlands from sea level rise.84 Equating resilience in environmental law with
strengthening social-ecological systems by resisting phase changes is a blinkered
misunderstanding of resilience as sustainability. 85 Instead, adaptive governance to
promote transformation will become increasingly important, and not just in illfunctioning urban watersheds. Perhaps our greatest current environmental challenge
is decarbonizing our energy systems. Resilient approaches to address the challenge,
such as the “Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project,”86 will employ law reform to
drive a transformation in the social-ecological system of energy production and use.87
Whether at the scale of a local watershed or a national energy system, transformative
governance provides hope to people shut out of previous conceptions of
environmental decision-making.
Emphasizing the notion that environmental law is for people—provisioning their
wants and resolving their disputes—resilience of social-ecological systems steers us
away from dualist notions of nature versus society that seldom help the
environmentalist cause. For instance, Greg Siekaniec, Alaska regional director of the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, commented on the dispute over whether to drill for
oil on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. He said that America’s refuges are
dedicated to “wildlife conservation over human use.” 88 A resilience framework

83. Benson & Garmestani, supra note 77, at 394.
84. Robert L. Fischman, Vicky J. Meretsky, Alexei Babko, Michael Kennedy, Lei Liu,
Michelle Robinson & Susan Wambugu, Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons
from the US National Wildlife Refuge System, 64 BIOSCIENCE 993, 1001 (2014) (finding that,
where refuge plans provided prescriptions to adapt to climate change, they overwhelmingly
chose resistance strategies such as through shoreline hardening).
85. Benson & Garmestani, supra note 77, at 394.
86. DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, http://deepdecarbonization.org
[https://perma.cc/6D2L-TPUS].
87. Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale
Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10591 (2017).
88. Bob Reiss, Bolstered by Trump, Big Oil Resumes Its 40-Year Quest to Drill in an
Arctic Wildlife Refuge, FORTUNE (Sept. 15, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/15/Donald
-trump-big-oil-alaska-arctic-wildlife-refuge
[https://perma.cc/R3CN-LM75].
Congress
subsequently mandated a program of oil and gas leasing in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054
(2017).
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would consider wildlife conservation to be an objective for human use. The two are
linked in a social-ecological system. Dualism sets up false choices.
Isolating the social from the ecological led the Idaho Supreme Court to deny
federal reserved water rights for Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge.89 Federal public
land law reserves to the United States implied water rights needed to avoid frustration
of the primary purpose for creating the reserve. 90 President Franklin Roosevelt
created Deer Flat Refuge to provide breeding and resting grounds for native birds on
islands in the Snake River.91 As part of Idaho’s adjudication of water rights on the
Snake, the supreme court rejected the United States’ claim that the reservation
required enough water to flow through the Snake by the islands, during bird breeding
season, to ensure that nests remain isolated from the river banks. 92 Without those
instream flow rights, irrigation upstream of the refuge sometimes lowers water flows
so much that the refuge islands become peninsulas. The low flows subject nesting
birds to predators. The Idaho court held that denying the water rights and allowing
the land bridges to form between the islands and the river banks would not defeat the
primary purpose of the refuge.93 It justified its position by explaining that the
president intended the refuge to benefit humans as the primary focus. The court wrote
that it is “inconceivable that President Roosevelt . . . intended to give preference to
waterfowl, or any other migratory bird, over people.”94 A more honest assessment of
the decision is that it shifted the Snake River SES from serving some people who
benefit from birds to other people who benefit from more irrigation diversions.
In severing conservation from benefits to people, the court misunderstood the role
of wildlife in the environmental law. In a political competition between people and
other animals, always bet on people. Resilience as an organizing principle of
environmental law makes it easier to see how the two are inseparable. Hunters of
caribou and waterfowl well south of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge breeding
grounds are part of that refuge’s social-ecological system. So are birdwatchers and
others who enjoy wildlife observation. And, we should not discount the role of the
arctic systems in supporting agriculture itself, through the arctic breeding of birds
that reduce crop loss by eating insect pests far from their summer range.
B. Managing Resilience through Adaptation
One reason that resilience works so well for environmental law is that it is not
easily confused with an outcome, as is the case with sustainability. Properly
understood, resilience is a property we need to work with, in pursuing our social
vision.
A resilience approach emphasizes combined strategies of enhancing
resistance (e.g., survival and persistence), recovery (re-establishing the

89. United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117, 129 (Idaho 2001).
90. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699–700 (1978).
91. Exec. Order No. 7655, 2 Fed. Reg. 1453 (1937); Exec. Order No. 7691, 2 Fed. Reg.
1422 (1937).
92. United States v. State, 23 P.3d at 127.
93. Id. at 126–29.
94. Id. at 128–29.
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prior community following disturbance), and reorganization (allowing
new suites of species to colonize an area that may be more adaptive under
new conditions, and facilitating geographic migration of species). In this
framework, new species moving into an area may be viewed [not simply
as an invasive bad. It may instead reflect] an ecological response to
climate pressure, and assisted migration techniques may be needed to
conserve species whose climate envelope has shifted.95
Environmental law is fundamentally procedural rather than substantive. 96 It is a way
of allocating rights and responsibilities, considering impacts (such as through
NEPA),97 setting goals (such as water quality standards),98 managing harmful
activities (such as air pollution emissions), 99 and translating land management
objectives (such as healthy populations of wildlife) to particular contexts (such as a
particular wildlife refuge).100
The process and systems view of environmental law is particularly important in
addressing the epochal challenge of climate change. Without a coherent theory of
environmental law, addressing climate change may deliver “emergent harms”
resulting from uncoordinated approaches or neglect of how solutions redistribute
social costs and benefits.101 Reforming environmental law, therefore, will not be so
different from creating environmental law. The birth of the modern era of federal
environmental law can be fairly traced to Congress’ 1969 enactment of NEPA.102
The NEPA action-forcing mechanism of environmental impact analysis sought to
integrate many different fields of study to provide a comprehensive understanding of
all the consequences from a proposed course of action (and its alternatives). 103
Today, we need analyses that retain the social-ecological integration but provide
more iterative adjustments than the front-loaded NEPA and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) requirements.
Adaptive management fits that bill by treating actions or policies as experiments
to test hypotheses about how the social-ecological system responds to human
alterations.104 The speed with which legal institutions and statutes integrate adaptive
management will indicate the degree to which resilience emerges as a framework for
environmental law. Adaptive management needs continual monitoring and flexibility

95. Donald A. Falk, The Resilience Dilemma: Incorporating Global Change into
Ecosystem Policy and Management, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145, 148 (2016).
96. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 220, 239.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2012).
101. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 47, at 1019.
102. LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 67–68.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
104. The term “adaptive management” typically refers to specific natural resources
decision-making, such as annual catch limits for fisheries. The term “adaptive governance”
refers to a similar iterative process, but more focused on broader issues associated with legal
and policy reforms. Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern
the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1908 (2003).
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to tinker with environmental management. 105 Those needs require legal reform.
Adaptive management requires breathing space to allow learning to occur and
actions to be altered in response to previous cycles of action. 106 Federal agencies have
succeeded in undertaking adaptive management within the framework of NEPA, but
it is an awkward fit with the comprehensive rationality of administrative law. 107 The
next era of environmental law will require creation of iterative processes that provide
the public input and analytical rigor of NEPA but that allow for more
experimentation.108 Adaptive management works best in highly resilient systems,
which are more forgiving of misguided interventions seeking to preserve the
ecological goods and services demanded by people. 109 A resilience framework for
regulation of potentially harmful or polluting technologies may similarly adapt to
unanticipated effects through ex post adjustments.110
Another challenge for implementing adaptive management in environmental law
is to retain flexibility yet actually impose enforceable constraints on actions that
affect resilience in an undesirable way.111 Practitioners of adaptive management need
new legal frameworks that force them to state measurable objectives for an action
and to identify thresholds that will trigger specific responses to monitoring. 112
Otherwise, management may drift from its objectives. As Professor Camacho
observes, “providing ad hoc, vague directives for experimental, collaborative
regulatory processes invites delay and indecision to the detriment of those resources
harmed by inaction.”113
C. Resilience in Environmental Law Scholarship
The notion that resilience can fill the hollow soul of environmental law is
increasingly popular in environmental law scholarship, though the amount of
commentary is still relatively small. A Westlaw search of law journal articles
containing the term “resilience” in a title yielded 114 publications as of December
31, 2017.114 Of these, ninety-eight articles substantively grappled with some aspect

105. Robert L. Fischman & J.B. Ruhl, Judging Adaptive Management Practices of U.S.
Agencies, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 269 (2015).
106. Id. at 270.
107. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 425, 426 (2010).
108. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014).
109. Humby, supra note 3, at 94.
110. See Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk
Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 247–51, 255–
56 (2017).
111. Doremus, supra note 50, at 53; Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 105, at 272.
112. Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 105, at 272.
113. Alejandro Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management
from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 953 (2008).
114. Search of Westlaw for “TI(resilience)” for publication type “Law Reviews &
Journals.” The “TI” segment in Westlaw includes not only the actual text of the title but also
the text of any footnote linked to the title. E.g., Johan Colding & Carl Folke, The Taboo
System: Lessons About Informal Institutions for Nature Management, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
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of resilience. Since 2000, when the first article applying resilience to environmental
law appeared,115 resilience has become a popular term in many legal specialties. For
instance, twelve articles applied the term in its psychological sense to mean the
capacity to recover from harm and setbacks. 116 Other fields engage with resilience,
but at lower frequencies: four articles applied resilience to financial regulation, four
to cybersecurity and information law, and three to health care. 117
No other subject matter of law journal articles comes close to environmental law
in its depth of scholarly discussion of resilience. A narrow scope of articles about
pollution control and resource management yields twenty-eight publications on
resilience. Broadening the environmental law category to include urban planning,
land use, infrastructure, disaster mitigation, and U.S. food security, yields fifty-two
articles total.118 After a lone analysis of informal institutions in 2000, no
environmental law article indicated a focus on resilience in its title until 2007. Since
then, all years but 2011 have seen publication of at least one environmental law
article on resilience. Nonetheless, it is a trickle of scholarship, except for the three
years when law reviews published symposia on the subject.119 An article title search
provides only a rough guide and surely undercounts articles dealing with resilience
in environmental law. For instance, one of the contributions to a symposium on
“Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water
Systems Facing a Changing Climate” does not contain the word “resilience” in its
title even though the article discusses resilience extensively in the context of

L. REV. 413, 413 (2000) (footnote to title stating “This article is sponsored by the Resilience
Network . . . .”).
115. Id.
116. E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307, 320 (2014).
117. E.g., Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2011) (financial regulation); Pierre de Vries, The Resilience Principles:
A Framework for New ICT Governance, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 137 (2011)
(information and communication law); Christina S. Ho, In Defense of Circular Reasoning:
The Affordable Care Act and the Resilience of Law and Self-Reference, 5 WM. & MARY POL’Y
REV. 1 (2013) (health care law).
118. E.g., Meredith Hiller & Stephen J. Humes, Resilience in the Utility Industry: Working
Against the Rising Tides, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2017, at 12 (infrastructure);
Charles Lester & Mary Matella, Managing the Coastal Squeeze: Resilience Planning for
Shoreline Residential Development, 36 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 23 (2016) (planning); John R.
Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience, Retreat, and Due Diligence, 39
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (2015) (land use); Nathalie N. Prescott,
Agroterrorism, Resilience, and Indoor Farming, 23 ANIMAL L. 103 (2016) (food security);
Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles
and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 38
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,171 (disaster mitigation) (2008).
119. The three environmental law-related symposia are in volume 87 of the Nebraska Law
Review (2009); volume 51 of the Idaho Law Review (2014); and volume 48 of Arizona State
Law Journal (2016). Natural Resources & Environmental Law Edition, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(2014); Resilience & Environmental Law Reform Symposium, 87 NEB. L. REV. 821 (2009);
Symposium, The Wildfire Menace, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2016).
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governance and adaptive capacity to climate change in the Everglades. 120 Therefore,
I did not count it in my rough survey.
Professor Humby conducted a literature review of a broader domain of
scholarship that included Google Scholar.121 Her larger sample provided a smoother
picture of increased commentary over the past two decades. My review confirms her
findings that the adaptability element of resilience is the most common focus of the
legal literature.122 Reliability, efficiency, scalability, or modularity elements of
resilience123 are commonly discussed in the legal literature, but not as consistently.
It is fair to say that a new theme of resilience is emerging and enlivening
environmental law scholarship. The next Part explores whether that scholarly
trajectory can spur or parallel a rise in environmental law reform to better account
for resilience.
III. CAN RESILIENCE MEET THE DEMANDS SOCIETY PLACES ON THE ENVIRONMENT?
The fallacy of naturalism cautions that observed attributes of nature are not
necessarily ethical or suitable goals for humans. 124 In adopting a framework for
setting environmental goals, we need to tread carefully and critically examine
whether resilience serves the interests and morals of people. The major challenge to
resilience as an organizing framework is that the legal fidelity to finality and security
comes from real social demands. People like stability. People rely on the
environment to provide the goods and services to which they have become
accustomed. Adults delight when children experience the same parks and fishing
streams that they recall from their youth. Lenders want assurances that their
investments will be protected from environmental variability. Property owners
cherish stability as a core value. How can we reconcile those—sometimes
unrealistic—demands with the fluid adaptation of resilience? 125

120. See Gunderson et al., supra note 78.
121. See Humby, supra note 3.
122. Id. at 102.
123. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1389–90 (relying in large part on David L. Alderson & John C.
Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications for Network-Centric
Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS., MAN & CYBERNETICS 839, 840 (2010)).
124. See, e.g., Newton & Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 28.
125. This question of reconciling legal goals with environmental management strategies is
a key challenge for legal scholars. See Marchant & Stevens, supra note 110, at 251
(“[R]esilience involves a commitment to fluidity and malleability that may be contrary to the
traditional legal purpose of ensuring stability and predictability.”) (citing Barbara A. Cosens
et al., The Role of Law in Adaptive Governance, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2017, at 1
(explaining how “legal systems are also purposely structured to prefer the status quo by
fostering stability and predictability” and that “[a]s a result of this stabilizing structure, legal
systems may pose barriers to adaption”)); John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the
Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 737 (2017).
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A. Stasis and Change in the Environment
A hallmark of system resilience is the capacity to maintain a high level of
consistency of behavioral structure in the face of a dynamic environment.126 That is
why it can be easy to confuse resilience with stability. But, some dynamic changes,
inevitably, push systems over the line into new states that may produce very different
goods and services. Resilience offers tools to help us grapple with changes in the
variability of environmental conditions as former standards, such as historical
benchmarks (e.g., 100-year floods), become unreliable. High variability and low
predictability are probably the greatest challenges for maintaining resilience and
adaptive capacity in environmental law. 127
One response is that people must resign themselves to the fact that they can’t
always get what they want. Law simply cannot deliver certainty in our rapidly
changing environment, now behaving outside of historical ranges of variation.128 As
Professors Benson and Craig explain, a resilience framework places people in a role
“characterized by neither impotence nor omnipotence.” 129 In other words, we need
to manage for human objectives, but we cannot expect success at every turn. What
was “natural,” such as a particular flood frequency, or “native,” such as a particular
set of mosquito species, is no longer a reliable guide for management. Resilience,
more than sustainability, reminds people that change cannot be halted and that
change may arrive in sudden bursts, creating “a new abnormal.”130 Ecosystems may
absorb more and more stress and continue to produce services—until they flip into a
different state, perhaps in a short time frame.131 Other environmental changes sound

126. See J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in
Legal Systems––With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1376
(2011).
127. Id. at 1393.
128. The authoritative report on climate change and the environment is U.N.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT (2015). See generally P.C.D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M.
Hirsch, Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity
is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCI. 573 (2008) (explaining that current
environment change now undermines the traditional assumption in resource management that
natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability). More recent analyses
raise the prospect that self-reinforcing feedbacks from current greenhouse-gas emissions could
push the atmosphere across a transformation threshold into a “Hothouse Earth” equilibrium of
much higher temperatures than projected by the 2014 Synthesis Report. Will Steffen et al.,
Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8252
(2018).
129. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 48.
130. Alene Tchekmedyian, Gov. Brown: Mega-Fires "The New Abnormal" for California,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018, 5:22 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me
-california-fires-woolsey-hill-camp-gov-brown-mega-fires-the-new-1541985742-htmlstory
.html#nt=card [https://perma.cc/Z5DJ-DFSF]. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., DISASTER
RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE (2012), http://nap.edu/13457 [https://perma.cc/P5ZK43MU] (promoting a resilience approach to disaster recovery).
131. Unanticipated changes are not always adverse to human welfare. For instance, recent
studies suggest that warming arctic temperatures may alter the behavior of spiders in such a
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gradual, such as a 3mm/year rise in global sea levels. 132 A snail could outwalk that
disaster! Virginia Beach and Miami Beach experience this consequence of
greenhouse-gas emissions as a gradual worsening of high-tide flooding. But, climate
change also increases the intensity of abrupt disasters where ordinary storms produce
extraordinary flooding, due in part to the higher sea levels or warmer temperatures. 133
Sustainability has a terrible record in fulfilling the promise of stability in such
environmental goods as public land timber and marine fisheries. 134 Even before the
effects of climate change were felt, ecologists of the 1970s came to realize that
ecosystems were neither stable, persistent, nor predictable.135 Resilience will promise
less but deliver more of what it promises. One pitfall to avoid is the tendency to over
promise, as sustainability often did over the past few decades. Still, resilience, like
sustainability (or justice, for that matter) is a “malleable term” whose “popularity
provides only a façade of consensus.”136 One danger of adopting resilience as a legal
framework is it gives the impression, literally from its etymology, that it will ensure
that systems “leap back” to their former state after shocks, without permanent
rupture.137 This is the common understanding of engineering resilience or

way as to control greenhouse gas emitting fungi. Amanda M. Klotz, Aimée T. Classen & Justin
P. Wright, Warming Reverses Top-Down Effects of Predators on Belowground Ecosystem
Function in Arctic Tundra, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E7541 (2018).
132. Sönke Dangendorf, Marta Marcos, Guy Wöppelmann, Clinton P. Conrad, Thomas
Frederikse & Riccardo Riva, Reassessment of 20th Century Global Mean Sea Level Rise, 114
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5946, 5946 (2017) (estimating a rise of 3.1 mm/year from 1993 to
2012, reflecting a substantial increase from the rate observed from 1901 to 1990). Three
millimeters is approximately one tenth of an inch. Future rates of sea level rise will be even
greater due to ever-increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. See
Alexander Nauels, Joeri Rogelj, Carl-Friedrich Schleussner, Malte Meinshausen & Matthias
Mengel, Linking Sea Level Rise and Socioeconomic Indicators Under the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 114002 (2017).
133. E.g., Kevin E. Trenberth, Lijing Cheng, Peter Jacobs, Yongxin Zhang & John Fasullo,
Hurricane Harvey Links to Ocean Heat Content and Climate Change Adaptation, 6 EARTH’S
FUTURE 730, 730, 735 (2018) (finding that Hurricane Harvey, which dumped a “recordshattering” sixty inches of rain in several locations, “could not have produced so much rain
without human-induced climate change”); see also Kerry Emanuel, Assessing the Present and
Future Probability of Hurricane Harvey’s Rainfall, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12681, 12681
(2017) (finding that the annual probability of a Harvey-sized rainfall increased from 1% during
1981−2000 to 6% in 2017).
134. See Lois H. Dellert, Sustained Yield: Why Has It Failed to Achieve Sustainability?, in
THE WEALTH OF FORESTS: MARKETS, REGULATION, AND SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 255 (Chris
Tollefson ed., 1998) (illustrating how sustainable forestry failed in British Columbia); Michael
C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405 (1994) (explaining the legal and political failures to achieve
sustained yield of renewable resources on federal public lands); Josh Eagle, James N.
Sanchirico & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ocean Zoning and Spatial Access Privileges:
Rewriting the Tragedy of the Regulated Ocean, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 646 (2008) (describing
the failure of the United States regulatory regimes to prevent overfishing or rebuild stocks).
135. E.g., Holling, supra note 4.
136. Newton & Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 23.
137. Resilient, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002).
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robustness.138 Ecological resilience, however, is simply the measure of how much
alteration a system can absorb before losing its ability to recoil.139 Resilience as an
organizing principle can promise neither to resist change nor to sustain prior outputs
from social-ecological systems.
Professors Victor Flatt and Rob Verchick have lamented the repeated use of the
word “unprecedented” in press coverage of Hurricane Harvey without noting that
Texas already experienced a 40% increase in intense rainfall from storms over the
past century.140 In other words, Harvey is the new (ab-)normal even if, strictly
speaking, it lacks a historical precedent. Shortly after Harvey, Hurricane Irma roared
into Florida, breaking apart three tower cranes that damaged property as they fell. 141
A decade ago, a state court overturned an attempt by Miami-Dade County to
strengthen its regulation of cranes, which are currently designed to withstand winds
up to 145 miles per hour.142 The contractors for one of the buildings where Irma
destroyed the cranes called the storm “unprecedented” in an effort to shrug off
responsibility.143 Yet, Irma is consistent with damage we now expect hurricanes to
inflict on Florida.
There is some hope for law to consider softening its demand for stability. Over
the long-term, even the common law shows a willingness to bend to new conditions.
Many historians describe the nineteenth century shift in riparian water rights from a
natural flow guarantee to socially contingent, reasonable use as an illustration of
common law accommodating economic imperatives, such as the industrial revolution
in a landscape transformed by hydropower mills, dams, and reservoirs.144 Professor
Smith has shown in a series of articles how common law can and does continue to

138. See Forrest D. Fleischman, Kinga Boenning, Gustavo A. Garcia-Lopez, Sarah
Mincey, Mikaela Schmitt-Harsh, Katrin Daedlow, Maria Claudia Lopez, Xavier Basurto,
Burney Fischer & Elinor Ostrom, Disturbance, Response, and Persistence in Self-Organized
Forested Communities: Analysis of Robustness and Resilience in Five Communities in
Southern Indiana, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 4, 2010. Engineering resilience is the property
that allows a system to bounce back from disturbance and return to an equilibrium state.
Isabelle M. Côté & Emily S. Darling, Rethinking Ecosystem Resilience in the Face of Climate
Change, 8 PLOS BIOLOGY, no.7, 2010, at 1, 1; see also Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1386.
139. See Holling, supra note 4.
140. Victor B. Flatt & Rob Verchick, Burying Our Head in Sand on Climate Change No
Longer an Option, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com
/opinion/outlook/article/Burying-our-head-in-sand-on-climate-change-no-12238961.php
[https://perma.cc/J88U-F2LU].
141. Joel Rose, Florida Crane Accidents Renew Safety Debate, NPR (Sept. 13, 2017, 5:02
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/09/13/550607370/irma-spotlights-dangers-of-construction
-cranes [https://perma.cc/7U6J-G7NC].
142. Id.
143. Id. The fastest wind from Irma in Florida measured by the National Weather Service
was 142 miles per hour, but between buildings wind tunnel effects can cause much higher
gusts. Hurricane Irma Recap, WEATHER CHANNEL (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://
weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/hurricane-tropical-storm-irma-recap-2017 [https://perma
.cc/GPY2-YVLD].
144. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780−1860, at 31
(1977); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780−1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973).
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respond to many changes in social attitudes towards the environment, despite the
dominance of statutes in the field.145 In particular, Smith demonstrated that common
law judges are able to contextualize aspects of the environment, such as trees, in
order to determine when they add value to the landscape and when they may be a
nuisance.146 Through consideration of the socio-cultural context, a court can act as a
counterweight to “inflexible environmental statutory directives” and protect the
social value of stability at least as well as legislators. 147 Others have identified an
evolutionary pattern to statutory environmental law that is not terribly different from
the resilience of the common law.148 Where and when resistance to phase changes in
the social-ecological system is futile, resilient law can focus on steering a transition
from one equilibrium state into another with the least possible system disruption.
Letting go of stability may benefit many people. Stasis is not an attractive social
objective for those repressed by discrimination or poverty. The Indianapolis residents
in the vicinity of Pleasant Run may prefer transformation because they see a more
prosperous and equitable future under a different social-ecological regime. The
possibility of transformation in a resilience framework may help expand the
constituency for environmental law to new supporters who can envision how their
lives would be improved through adaptive governance. But it does require opening
the legal debates to new voices, a subject I will tackle in the next Part on whether
law itself needs to be resilient.
One important shortcoming of resilience is that its systemic, stochastic approach
fails to speak in a compelling way to most of the public. People have difficulty seeing
the world as a chaotic, probabilistic system where causation is seldom direct. People
respond more strongly to identified, particular individuals facing slight harm than to
currently unknown, random people facing greater harm. 149 Oliver Wendell Holmes
put the dilemma this way: “most people think dramatically not quantitatively.”150 We

145. See, e.g., George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An
Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (1991). Professor
Sprankling describes how property law can move from a static to a flexible, adaptive system
in Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, supra note 125.
146. George P. Smith, II & David M. Steenburg, Environmental Hedonism or, Securing
the Environment Through the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 65,
111−12 (2015).
147. Id. at 112.
148. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313
(1985).
149. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 36−39 (1993). On the psychology of risk perception, see Paul Slovic, Baruch
Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK (Paul Slovic ed., 2016) (ebook); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 522−23
(2007) (explaining the “affect heuristic” where people respond better to identifiable persons
than to “deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying issues”).
150. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (July 5,
1912), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 63, 64 (David H. Burton ed., Fordham
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1993) (quoted in BREYER, supra note 149, at 37).
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can see the faces of the coal miners who may lose their jobs with a carbon tax. But
there are far more yet-identified people who will die prematurely from asthma and
other respiratory diseases caused by burning coal. How can law prompt the public to
care? It can embrace the love that people feel for each other, for other animals, and
for places, while articulating an inspiring vision.
On the conservation side of environmental law, advocates have long observed that
emotion is an important—but often neglected—factor. Resilience seems too cold a
term to inspire social change. Wendell Berry expressed the concern this way:
We know enough of our own history by now to be aware that people
exploit what they have merely concluded to be of value, but they defend
what they love. To defend what we love we need a particularizing
language, for we love what we particularly know.151
Affinity to place motivates environmental protection. The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan
has called this “affective bond between people and place” topophilia.152
Environmental law needs to find a better way to take more seriously this human
yearning for connection.153 Existing conservation programs that offer opportunities
for people to unplug and engage with nature will need to expand if resilience is to
serve as a foundational principle of environmental law.
Though enhancing resilience may increase the prospects for stability of systems,
it cannot guarantee stasis. What most of us know are ordinary places. Ordinary
components of the natural side of social-ecological systems play important roles in
modulating phase changes.154 Environmental law too often arrives late to a crisis,
when problems are nearly insoluble. This is almost always the case with endangered
species. The “not knowing what you’ve got until it’s gone”155 syndrome has
hamstrung environmental law with too many objectives that set it up for failure.
Greater focus on keeping the common abundant rather than simply trying to nurse
depleted systems would be a beneficial turn for environmental law. Bird migrations
are a good example of still-abundant ecological phenomena that can help sustain
social-ecological systems. Rather than waiting until obligate migrants decline to the
point of imperilment, taking steps early to secure the long-term future of migration
would make a greater contribution to social well-being.156 Similarly, concentrating
area-wide preserves in places of monumental scenery, such as national parks,
protects only a small global share of biodiversity. Yet, biodiversity is the redundant
ecological element that maintains resilience. Biodiversity is doomed without

151. WENDELL BERRY, LIFE IS A MIRACLE: AN ESSAY AGAINST MODERN SUPERSTITION 41
(2000).
152. YI-FU TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES,
AND VALUES 4 (1974).
153. Not all connections through affective bonding contribute to an inspiring vision. For
instance, they may promote racial and religious segregation.
154. See Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO
L. REV. 325 (2002).
155. JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise Records 1970).
156. See Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting
Animal Migrations as Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (2010).
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ecological connections between park and wildlife reserves, across ordinary
landscapes.157 That is another reason why demonstration of best conservation
practices in ordinary places is so important.158 Moreover, the productivity of
ecological services in ordinary places often far exceeds that of remote
environments.159
One approach proposed for managing future environmental conditions that cannot
sustain historically occurring ecosystems is to deliberately cultivate species and
services we want.160 Gardening nature is one way to embrace the Anthropocene. 161
Gardening the environment appeals to many Americans’ almost religious sense of
stewardship.162 It connects care for the backyard with care for the planet. It also
serves as an apt metaphor for many conservation innovations that will counteract the
effects of climate change. But, history cautions that what we think we want, from
channelized rivers to cheap food, may turn out in the end to do more harm than
good.163
B. Stasis and Strict Legal Rules
Humans and our institutions act within systems that both shape and react to nature.
The SES approach requires better understanding of this middle ground we occupy
with respect to getting what we want from nature. The American wilderness ideal of
conservation, with its vision of an unpeopled, untrammeled landscape, is almost
unique in international environmental law. 164 Much to the chagrin of Native
Americans, whose precolonial activities profoundly shaped the country encountered
by European settlers, “getting back to nature” has too often required erasing human

157. See Carl Folke, Steve Carpenter, Brian Walker, Marten Scheffer, Thomas Elmqvist,
Lance Gunderson & C.S. Holling, Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem
Management, 35 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 557 (2004).
158. Vicky J. Meretsky, Robert L. Fischman, James R. Karr, Daniel M. Ashe, J. Michael
Scott, Reed F. Noss & Richard L. Schroeder, New Directions in Conservation for the National
Wildlife Refuge System, 56 BIOSCIENCE 135, 140 (2006).
159. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 666 (2000) (citing, e.g., Dennis M. King & Luke W. Herbert, The
Fungibility of Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 10) (in promoting
functioning markets in wetlands mitigation banking, regulations tend to move wetlands-based
ecological services from highly populated areas to more remote locations providing fewer
ecological services to people).
160. See EMMA MARRIS, RAMBUNCTIOUS GARDEN: SAVING NATURE IN A POST-WILD
WORLD (2011); Falk, supra note 95, at 148.
161. See Simon L. Lewis & Mark A. Maslin, Defining the Anthropocene, 519 NATURE 171
(2015).
162. See JOHN PASSMORE, MAN’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974).
163. See, e.g., David G. Guest, “This Time for Sure”—A Political and Legal History of
Water Control Projects in Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 645
(2001) (describing the environmental problems that emerged from channelizing the
Okeechobee watershed); Margot J. Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural
Exceptionalism, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1233 (2016) (discussing the inequitable environmental
costs imposed by water pollution from cheap food production).
164. See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1967).
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history.165 Yet, American wilderness preservation has succeeded, against all odds, in
protecting and restoring cherished places. How it achieved that objective shines a
light on the greatest weakness of resilience as an overarching goal of environmental
law.
The Wilderness Act’s limits on public land development,166 the Endangered
Species Act’s (ESA) strict prohibitions on jeopardizing imperiled species,167 and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) ban on open dumping168 reflect
some of the most effective laws because they reject the cost-benefit balancing so
easily gamed and so often the slippery slope for incremental harms that undermine
environmental protection. Strict prohibitions may fail to tailor management to local
context. They appear unyielding and brittle—the antithesis of resilient. But, in
practical terms, an implementing agency is far too weak to deny powerful economic
interests their environmental resources without strict prohibitions. Critics assail the
nonsense behind the vision of an unpeopled history, 169 the goal of zero discharge of
pollutants to the nation’s waters,170 or the hubris of preventing all extinctions. 171 Yet,
without those bright lines constraining behavior, which hardly map on to the continua
of the environment, we would be living in a less resilient world unable to provide
many of the services we enjoy. The ESA statutory trigger of jeopardy, for example,
has been credited with signaling when key ecological thresholds of disruption may
be crossed and prompting collaborative approaches to water governance. 172
Lawyers who advocate for environmentalist organizations are among the greatest
critics of law reform that would supplant inflexible, “prohibitive policy”173 with
softer limitations on private activities or broader discretion for public agencies. There
may be no place on Earth untrammeled by humans. Some species cannot be rescued
from extinction. Resilience scholars often push for more flexibility in statutes such
as the ESA.174 But to replace conceptually flawed yet practically powerful objectives
with vague missions to garden ecosystems is a recipe for failure. Voluntary,
polycentric175 collaborative conservation is the gold (green?) standard for successful

165. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, 1 ENVTL. HIST. 7 (1996).
166. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012).
167. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c) (2012).
169. See, e.g., Cronon, supra note 165.
170. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Bazel, The Clean Water Act at Thirty: A Failure After All These
Years?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46 (2003).
171. See, e.g., CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995).
172. Barbara Cosens, Lance Gunderson & Brian Chaffin, The Adaptive Water Governance
Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water
Systems Facing a Changing Climate, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 27 (2014).
173. STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982).
174. E.g., Benson & Garmestani, supra note 77, at 395.
175. Polycentric order is “where many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments
for ordering their relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each
element acts with independence of other elements.” Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity (Part 1),
in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 52, 57 (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 1999).
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environmental management. But strict legal thresholds undergird such successes.
The ESA, in particular, with its divine command to prevent extinctions, is a
“regulatory driver” of about half of the hundreds of conservation collaborations
studied by Professors Steven Yaffee and Julia Wondolleck.176
To declare enhancing resilience a goal and then provide agencies with the latitude
to garden as they see fit is an approach at odds with history.177 Enforceable standards
for procedures and outcomes will continue to be necessary.178 Public land law
transformed in the 1970s in response to inadequate oversight and unmeasurable
criteria for management.179 Resilience will not work if it means turning back the
clock on federal natural resources legislation. Pollution control law also transformed
in the 1970s because insisting on a clear causative connection between a pollution
source and an undesirable ecological or human health effect proved unworkable. 180
Such an approach is no more feasible today than it was in 1969.
The greatest promise for resilience is that it may incorporate our understanding of
how social and environmental systems work together without discarding elements of
law that have demonstrated their effectiveness. 181 There is no doubt that resiliencerooted environmental law rejects a vision of strict preservationism. Professor Tarlock
and others warn that dynamic disequilibrium punctures the belief that we can either
maintain current ecological systems as they are or recover the systems as they once
existed.182 Climate change and human movements have reshuffled the composition
of ecosystems and are beginning to reshape the hydrologic, thermal, chemical, and
biological drivers that create functioning ecological relationships. 183 Our postmodern

176. JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK:
LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) (describing more
case studies); STEVEN L. YAFFEE, ALI F. PHILLIPS, IRENE C. FRENTZ, PAUL W. HARDY,
SUSSANNE M. MALEKI & BARBARA E. THORPE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE (1996); Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative
Strategies for Managing Animal Migrations: Insights from the History of Ecosystem-Based
Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 655, 677 (2011).
177. Some argue that it is also at odds with environmental ethics. For that debate, see
ROBERT ELLIOT, FAKING NATURE: THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION (Andrew
Brennan ed., 1997); ERIC KATZ, NATURE AS SUBJECT: HUMAN OBLIGATION AND NATURAL
COMMUNITY (James P. Sterba ed., 1997).
178. Benson & Germestani, supra note 77, at 396; see also Humby, supra note 3, at
114−15; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 944 (2003) (arguing that
“the absence of clear, legally enforceable, fixed procedural rules and substantive standards
will translate into a kind of open-ended discretion likely to yield to unprincipled compromise,
self-dealing, and a lack of accountability in basic governance processes”).
179. See Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm
in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 671 (2008).
180. Id. at 674.
181. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 185−86 (1990) (highlighting the importance of
monitoring and graduated enforcement for effective management of common resources).
182. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994).
183. See THE GREAT RESHUFFLING: HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES
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dilemma is that we have no clear reference points anymore for what our environment
should look like. But, a free-for-all approach to managing the environment will result
in less rather than more of what we want from nature over the long run. Rejecting
strict historic restoration or preservation only admits that nature won’t cooperate with
those goals. Resilience offers a guide for exploring what are reasonable demands to
make of the environment.
Just as freshwater lakes may tip from clear to eutrophied, reef systems shift
between coral domination and macro-algae domination.184 Australia’s Great Barrier
Reef is the largest living structure on Earth.185 About half the reef that existed in 1985
is now dead.186 This is a system poised for a transformation to an entirely new phase
of ecological composition and function.187 But, marine scientists are making progress
in selective breeding of coral that could result in planting some reefs with more heatresistant organisms.188 Such “assisted evolution” may stave off the transformation of
reef ecosystems into something of less use or beauty to humans. But, where does
gardening end? Should we replace lodgepole pine forests of the Rockies with more
beetle-resistant trees? The Great Lakes fisheries with warmer water animals able to
tolerate greater nutrient pollution? Puget Sound shellfish with cultivars better suited

(Jeffrey A. McNeely ed., 2001); Jessica J. Hellmann, James E. Byers, Britta G. Bierwagen &
Jeffrey S. Dukes, Five Potential Consequences of Climate Change for Invasive Species, 22
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 534 (2008); Janneke HilleRisLambers, Melanie A. Harsh, Ailene K.
Ettinger, Kevin R. Ford & Elinore J. Theobald, How Will Biotic Interactions Influence Climate
Change-Induced Range Shifts?, 1297 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 112 (2013).
184. Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good
Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L.
REV. 893, 897–98 (2009). Recent studies show that the proportion of blue, non-eutrophic lakes
in the United States decreased by 18% between just 2007 and 2012. This reflects a rapid
decline in water quality necessary for many human uses. Dina M. Leech, Amina I. Pollard,
Stephanie G. Labou & Stephanie E. Hampton, Fewer Blue Lakes and More Murky Lakes
Across the Continental U.S.: Implications for Planktonic Food Webs, LIMNOLOGY &
OCEANOGRAPHY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1002/lno.10967 [https://perma.cc/B6VK
-ERCN].
185. Daniel Cressey, Future of Great Barrier Reef Divides Scientists, 515 NATURE 16, 16
(2014).
186. See Damien Cave & Justin Gillis, Building a Better Coral Reef, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/climate/coral-great-barrier-reef.html [https://
perma.cc/W7HA-QZQH].
187. The authoritative surveys of the Australian Institute of Marine Science indicate that
“the cumulative impacts of multiple, severe disturbances” over the past few years, including
bleaching, cyclones, and starfish outbreaks, show steep declines of the Great Barrier Reef that
have “not been observed in the historical record.” AUSTL. INST. OF MARINE SCI., LONG-TERM
REEF MONITORING PROGRAM – ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT ON CORAL REEF CONDITION FOR
2017/18 (2018), https://www.aims.gov.au/reef-monitoring/gbr-condition-summary-2017
-2018 [https://perma.cc/J4NM-YLTD].
188. See, e.g., Rachel A. Levin, David J. Suggett, Matthew R. Nitschke, Madeleine J.H.
van Oppen & Peter D. Steinberg, Expanding the Symbiodinium (Dinophyceae, Suessiales)
Toolkit Through Protoplast Technology, 64 J. EUKARYOTIC MICROBIOLOGY 588 (2017) (cited
in India Bourke, CRISPR: Can Gene-Editing Help Nature Cope with Climate Change?,
NEWSTATESMAN (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/nature/2017/10
/crispr-can-gene-editing-help-nature-cope-climate-change [https://perma.cc/QA6C-ZWM6]).
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to its acidifying waters? For timber plantations and farm crops, the answers are
clearly affirmative and consistent with the millennia of human experience with
improving productivity.
Should environmental management be more like agricultural practices? Maybe,
when it comes to retaining some iconic Joshua trees in Joshua Tree National Park. 189
The park area increasingly is too hot and dry to support the eponymous plants.
Resisting the demise of the trees will require irrigation. Guiding the transformation
of the ecosystem will require even more intensive management. In either event,
though, a hands-off approach to let “nature take its course” is unlikely to achieve the
goal of the national park unit.190 The National Park Service long hewed to the handsoff approach, best articulated in the 1963 “Leopold Report” that recommended
preserving park ecosystems in the condition “that prevailed when the area was first
visited by the white man,” as a “vignette of primitive America.”191 The Park Service
responded to climate change and theories about ecological disequilibrium by
emphasizing resilience when it revised the Leopold Report in 2012:
The overarching goal . . . should be to steward . . . resources for
continuous change that is not yet fully understood, in order to preserve
ecological integrity and cultural and historical authenticity, provide
visitors with transformative experiences, and form the core of a national
conservation land- and seascape.192
This goal recognizes not only the disequilibrium of ecosystems, but also the potential
for a phase change in the social dimension of resilience: “transformative
experiences.” It is a rare acknowledgement that people may have to fundamentally
revise their expectations where nature itself cannot fulfill SES objectives.
Transformative experiences include love of place, which may be necessary to
motivate public support for resilient conservation. 193
The National Park Service Director adopted the recommendation of the revised
Leopold Report in a 2016 order that emphasized resilience in resource

189. David N. Cole, Constance I. Millar & Nathan L. Stephenson, Responding to Climate
Change: A Toolbox of Management Strategies, in BEYOND NATURALNESS: RETHINKING PARK
AND WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 179, 184 (David N. Cole &
Laurie Yung eds., 2010).
190. See David N. Cole et al., Naturalness and Beyond: Protected Area Stewardship in an
Era of Global Environmental Change, 25 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 36, 37 (2008).
191. Advisory Bd. on Wildlife Mgmt., Wildlife Management in the National Parks: The
Leopold Report, CRATER LAKE INST. (Mar. 4, 1963), http://www.craterlakeinstitute.com
/online-library/leopold-report/complete.htm [https://perma.cc/QQ68-7AW6]. See generally,
GARY E. MACHLIS & JONATHAN B. JARVIS, THE FUTURE OF CONSERVATION IN AMERICA: A
CHART FOR ROUGH WATER 24–26 (2018) (describing the evolution of Park Service strategies
to fulfill its conservation mission).
192. NAT’L PARK SYS. ADVISORY BD. SCI. COMM., REVISITING LEOPOLD: RESOURCE
STEWARDSHIP IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 11 (2012).
193. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text; e.g., TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS,
THE HOUR OF LAND: A PERSONAL TOPOGRAPHY OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS (2016) (a
memoir and travelogue combining love of family with love of parks).
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management.194 But the Trump Administration rescinded the order, presumably
because of its assertion that the agency needed to respond to climate change. 195
Congress has begun to consider resilience enhancement as a way to resist disruptive
environmental changes. In its massive Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018,
Congress created fast-track approval for “wildfire resilience projects” to promote
retention of old-growth and large trees threatened by insects, disease, and crown
fires.196
Gardening suggests a certain level of human mastery over the environment. While
humans may certainly claim responsibility for profound alterations in the
environment, our experience cautions against conflating that with mastery over the
environment. The chaotic, stochastic nature of nature, resilience teaches, will upset
our expectations in sudden and highly disruptive ways. Professors Craig and Benson
go so far as to argue that we need new narratives to understand this resilient
landscape. They look to the myths of the trickster creature, such as the coyote in
many Native American cultures, to frame narratives that will increase the public’s
comfort with the realities of unwanted change.197 Stability we crave, but it is
exceedingly difficult to engineer in a complex, adaptive system. The greatest
challenge for resilience as an environmental law objective is that it will not fulfill the
expectation of sustaining what we like. But, it can guide us generally in a direction
that can retain as much as we can under the circumstances.
Environmental governance is a continuum of practices in between the two
extreme poles of preserving historical landscapes on one hand, and gardening
entirely novel ecosystems on the other. 198 In fact, untamed, primeval nature has
always been an ideal rather than a reality in environmental law. Gardening as a
metaphor for incremental adjustments in response to management activities that also
serve as adaptive experiments is well suited to describe the thematic aims of
environmental law. Gardening as erasing the existing environment to create
something entirely new is probably just as unrealistic and dangerous an approach as
resisting environmental change up to the very point of futility. Environmental law
has always comprised compromises. All of the strict prohibitions in the Wilderness
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act may be waived by permits
or exemptions.199 Environmental law can accommodate pragmatic adjustments to

194. National Park Service Director’s Order #100: Resource Stewardship for the 21st
Century §§ 1.1, 5 (Dec. 20, 2016) (rescinded Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/policy
/dorders/do_100.htm [https://perma.cc/WCQ3-LW68].
195. Rob Hotakainen, NPS Chief Scraps Climate-Focused Order, E&E NEWS (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059511 [https://perma.cc/KWD3-KTUV].
196. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. O, Title II, § 202
(amending the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 6511 (2012)).
197. BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 50−56.
198. Anthony D. Barnosky et al., Merging Paleobiology with Conservation Biology to
Guide the Future of Terrestrial Ecosystems, 355 SCI. 594, 594 (2017).
199. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012) (providing special exceptions to the prohibition on
commercial enterprises and motorized equipment); 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (providing an
exemption procedure for otherwise prohibited federal actions causing jeopardy to endangered
species); 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012) (providing permits for otherwise prohibited incidental takes
of endangered animals); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (providing permits for otherwise prohibited
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mitigate extreme disruptions without promising absolute resistance to change. But,
how does resilience relate to the design principles for law reform itself?
IV. SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ITSELF BE RESILIENT?
If the naturalistic fallacy is a danger in adopting an observed attribute of natural
systems as an environmental objective, it is an even greater hazard when we turn to
the question of legal design.200 Earlier flirtations with applying natural science theory
to law in the form of eugenics and social Darwinism raise cautionary flags.201 Yet
much of the non-legal literature on resilience neglects the problem of inflexible law
completely reliant on uncertain predictions. 202 The social-ecological systems
framework links the institutional concerns of law to the ecological concerns of
natural resources management. Therefore, it is not possible to consider resilience
objectives of environmental law without also reforming the adaptive capacity of law
to promote resilient governance.203 Many areas of statutory law, such as pollution
control, operate under legislative charters that have scarcely changed in over a
quarter century.204 Still, federal environmental law already has adaptive qualities.
This is especially evident in statutes that establish broad goals, standards, and
procedures for engagement, yet leave specific application to the flexible response of
states and agencies.205
Answering whether environmental law itself should be more resilient plunges us
into the constitutive question of how institutions and procedures are structured.206 In
other words, how should we decide how to decide? Professor Clark argues that the
answer is less about the substantive policy choices embedded in legislation or
regulation.207 Instead, it is more about who participates in making those choices, and
how. These questions of justice and participation underlie environmental law reform
challenges.208 Ultimately, environmental law must establish a framework for

discharges of pollution into waters of the United States).
200. See Elliott et al., supra note 148.
201. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing the Court’s experience with Lochner and constitutional social Darwinism);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1955); VICTORIA
F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN
EUGENICS (2008).
202. Olivia Odom Green et al., Barriers and Bridges to the Integration of SocialEcological Resilience and Law, 13 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 332, 332 (2015).
203. See Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1382.
204. See LAZARUS, supra note 16, at 125–26.
205. See Daniel A. DeCaro, Brian C. Chaffin, Edella Schlager, Ahjond S. Garmestani & J.
B. Ruhl, Legal and Institutional Foundations of Adaptive Environmental Governance, 22
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2017.
206. See Susan G. Clark & Marian E. Vernon, Elk Management and Policy in Southern
Greater Yellowstone: Assessing the Constitutive Process, 50 POL’Y SCI. 295 (2017); see also
Nick Abel et al., Building Resilient Pathways to Transformation When “No One Is in
Charge”: Insights from Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2016.
207. Clark & Vernon, supra note 206.
208. See Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q.
809 (2018).
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collective governance. In other words, resilient law should give voice to people in an
equitable manner. Resilience may sacrifice stability. But, it can deliver better
distributional results by integrating the social with the ecological in systems analysis
in environmental law.
Can a statutory system that is the vintage of the 8-track tape player properly adapt
to new conditions? Proponents of a resilience framework often answer “no.” 209 They
argue that law itself needs to be resilient in order to promote experimentation and
change in response. For instance, the Clean Air Act, last significantly amended in
1990, ignores the harms from greenhouse-gas emissions.210 The EPA attempted to
bend the Act’s framework to better address the problem of climate change. 211 Instead
of tailoring a rule to the statute, the EPA attempted to tailor a rule to social-ecological
conditions.212 The Supreme Court stopped the effort.213 The EPA possesses some
flexibility in implementing the Act, but not enough to adapt the statutory provision
authorizing stationary source regulation to the mitigation challenge of reducing
greenhouse-gas emissions.
Professor Ruhl characterized resilience in legal systems as providing consistency
“notwithstanding continuous change of external and internal conditions.” 214 My
review of the law journal resilience literature indicates that about three-quarters of
environmental/natural resources articles (twenty-one of twenty-eight) distinguish the
role of resilience in setting environmental law objectives from its role in reforming
law itself.215 Most of the articles also address both issues head-on.216 This should not
be surprising in the law journals, which—after all—remain centrally engaged with
legal analysis and reform.
Just as adaptive management promises to learn while doing and to reduce
uncertainty through experimentation in achieving environmental goals, 217 adaptive
governance approaches law as a contingent experiment subject to iterative finetuning.218 A more resilient environmental law would be designed not as a fail-safe,
static utopia. Instead, the emergent resilience property of social-ecological systems

209. See, e.g., BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 3, at 169–81; Ruhl, supra note 9.
210. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q).
211. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,513 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (“tailoring” the
criteria of the Act’s prevention of significant deterioration program to impose new permitting
requirements for greenhouse-gas emissions for just the most significant stationary sources).
212. See id. at 31,517 to 31,518.
213. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
214. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1379.
215. E.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and
Resilience, 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,426, 10,428–29, 10,436–37 (May 2013).
216. See, e.g., id.
217. See supra notes 104–13 and accompanying text.
218. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Alejandro E.
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55
UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007); Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
113 (2015).
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demands a “safe-fail” approach that recognizes constant upheaval and adjustment. 219
Unlike systems resistant to change, safe-fail environmental law would encourage
openness and experimentation in social institutions. Resilient law would mirror the
bottom-up approach to managing the commons so closely associated with the
Ostroms’ Bloomington School.220 We do need core principles and long-term
planning, but with many iterative opportunities along the way to adjust to new
conditions, better understandings, and changed social values.221 Resilient law would
provide avenues for citizens to express preferences and influence decisions. Much of
that is squarely the province of procedural environmental law. Environmental law
procedure can embrace resilience through mechanisms that generate knowledge and
promote adaptive responses. Much can be done through administrative decisions, but
the profound shift from stability to resilience will ultimately require statutory reform.
If Ambassador Bryce was correct that the national park system is “America’s best
idea,”222 then NEPA’s environmental impact analysis is America’s most copied
environmental law idea.223 Both have their roots in the transcendental philosophy
popularized by Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir, patriarchs of the environmental
movement.224 Thoreau, in particular, called for a morality of living “deliberately.” 225
Fen Montaigne has characterized this as a system of “weighing the moral
consequences of one’s actions.”226 Resilience contributes a new framework for
weighing these consequences. It informs rather than replaces the fundamental,
jurisprudential core of environmental law: considering consequences. Environmental
law frequently insists on consideration of impacts that may be far removed in place
or time from their causes. 227 The legislative basis for environmental law is largely a

219. Alicia Juarrero-Roqué, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an
Evolutionary Model of Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (1991).
220. ELINOR OSTROM AND THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note
55.
221. Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
295 (2003).
222. The quotation is often attributed to Wallace Stegner; but, he credits British
Ambassador to the United States, James Bryce, who gave a speech in 1912 to the American
Civic Association in which he discussed national parks. WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE
BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 128 (1992); Alan MacEachern, Who Had
“America’s Best Idea”?, NICHE (Oct. 23, 2011), http://niche-canada.org/2011/10/23/who
-had-americas-best-idea [https://perma.cc/HB7S-WVQB].
223. Nicholas C. Yost, Rio and the Road Beyond, A.B.A. ENVTL. L., Summer 1992, at 1,
6 n.15 (citing more than eighty-two nations).
224. See STEPHEN FOX, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION
MOVEMENT (1981); NASH, supra note 164; RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE:
A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Paul S. Boyer ed., 1989); DANIEL J. PHILIPPON,
CONSERVING WORDS: HOW AMERICAN NATURE WRITERS SHAPED THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (2004).
225. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 118 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971) (1854).
226. Fen Montaigne, American Surveyor, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 23, 2017, at 17
(reviewing LAURA DASSOW WALLS, HENRY DAVID THOREAU: A LIFE (2017)).
227. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2013) (requiring consideration of indirect effects, which
are “later in time or farther removed in distance” in environmental impact analysis under
NEPA); Protection of Visibility: Amendments to Requirements for State Plans, 82 Fed. Reg.
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response to the literal “shortcomings” of common-law adjudication to canvass the
indirect, synergistic, and remote effects of actions. 228 Legislation provided
administrative institutions and procedures for scientific expertise to forecast effects
beyond the scope of proximate cause. Environmental law promotes justice by
relating a cold, calculating decision about energy efficiency in clothes driers to the
effects of coal mining on people many hundreds of miles away who shoulder the loss
of ecological services and other environmental harms many years into the future. The
environmental justice movement is not so much a separate subfield of environmental
law but a clear demand that environmental law live up to its ambitions of weighing
moral consequences. The importance of environmental justice, which concerns the
inequities in the distribution of environmental amenities and injuries, is to remind us
of the core moral principle of law and extend it with deeper understanding.229
A resilient environmental law that includes the option of adaptive transformation
of social-ecological systems requires changes to governance.230 This means inviting
new voices to the table. Environmental law, long confined to its own, specialized
corridors of power, will be stretched thin to accommodate governance changes.
Natural resources agencies, in particular, are generally comfortable with
manipulating the ecological side of the social-ecological system. They are less
willing to address the social dimensions because these elements are outside of their
expertise and because their political power generally does not extend that far.231
Therefore, resilient environmental law will need to be more attentive to social
transformations. Very little legal analysis examines this aspect of resilient law and
better consideration of social change must be a priority for future research. It holds
promise to substantially increase the constituency of Americans who recognize how
they benefit from environmental law.
Consideration of the full range of consequences is not merely a technocratic
balancing of discounted and monetized costs versus benefits. It is a moral calculus
as well. Parks are good not just because they create tourist revenue or improve public
health. They are also good because they shape the moral character of generation after
generation of people exposed to them. Professor Sagoff observed that, if we leave to
future generations
an environment that is fit for pigs, they will be like pigs; their tastes will
adapt to their conditions as ours might when we move from the country
into town. Suppose we destroyed all of our literary, artistic, and musical
heritage . . . . We would then ensure a race of uncultured near illiterates.
Now, suppose we leave an environment dominated by dumps, strip
mines, and highways. Again, we will ensure that future individuals will
be illiterate, although in another way. Surely, we should strive to make

3078 (Jan. 10, 2017) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52) (addressing regional haze caused by
long-distant transport of pollutants).
228. See Fischman, supra note 179, at 674, 685.
229. See Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism for the Next Economy, in LAW AND POLICY
FOR A NEW ECONOMY 50 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017).
230. Matthew J. Colloff et al., Transforming Conservation Science and Practice for a
Postnormal World, 31 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1008, 1010 (2017).
231. Benson & Garmestani, supra note 77, at 396.
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the human race better . . . . Surely, it is morally bad for us to deteriorate
into a pack of yahoos who have lost both knowledge of and taste for the
things that give value and meaning to life. Future generations might not
complain: A pack of yahoos will like a junkyard environment. This is the
problem. That kind of future is efficient. It may well be equitable. But it
is tragic all the same. Our obligation to provide future individuals with
an environment consistent with ideals we know to be good is an
obligation not necessarily to those individuals but to the ideals
themselves.232
Sagoff reminds us that moral consequences are not pure calculations but expression
of our aspirations as a body politic. Former U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Director
Mollie Beattie summarized this view: “[w]hat a country chooses to save is what a
country chooses to say about itself.”233 Shaping the world requires considerations of
distributional justice to current generations and aspirations for the future. Kathryn
Schulz claimed residents of the Pacific Northwest have not fully grappled with the
potential for a catastrophic earthquake. She explained that the relative brevity of our
lives breeds “temporal parochialism.” 234 We have probably all heard about the
NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) who opposes certain environmental harms in his
own neighborhood but raises no objections to similar developments elsewhere. As
common is the NIMGY (“not in my generation’s years”) who resists difficult
adjustments now (such as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions) but raises no
objections to the harms that are then deferred to subsequent generations. One might
characterize much of the Trump Administration’s energy policies as temporally
parochial in their reluctance to pay the price today for grave future injuries. The
latency built into greenhouse-gas pollution raises particularly thorny moral issues. 235
The emissions of the past hundred years have largely locked future generations into
a much longer period of hotter temperatures, more frequent deluges, longer droughts,
higher sea levels, and more acidic waters. 236 Environmental law must grapple with
whether that is the future we want for our progeny.
Another design principle suggested by resilience is related to polycentrism237: the
ability of law to look across jurisdictional boundaries when necessary to follow

232. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 63 (1988).
233. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., A Look Back: Mollie Beattie, NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE
SYS. (last updated Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.fws.gov/refuges/about/conservationheroes
/Mollie%20Beattie_07182012.html [https://perma.cc/BF7X-LYVJ].
234. Kathryn Schulz, The Really Big One, NEW YORKER (July 20, 2015), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/the-really-big-one
[https://perma.cc/EE7B-JKNC].
Behavioral psychologists and economists describe this view as an availability heuristic or
bounded rationality. E.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
235. See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future
Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289; Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of the
Possible, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 289, 294–95 (2008).
236. U.N. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 128.
237. Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641 (2010).
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consequences and ecological effects. The misfit between boundaries of nature
reserves and the SES themselves is frequently cited in environmental law
scholarship.238 Case studies of how managers overcome boundary limitations
contribute to our toolbox of strategies, 239 but law could do a better job incorporating
greater flexibility. For instance, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service started facilitating
landscape conservation designs, which are collaborative efforts to better coordinate
what multiple but differently focused conservation stakeholders wish to accomplish
on lands and in programs they control.240 The Lower Wabash watershed in Illinois
and Indiana has experienced dramatic habitat loss and nutrient pollution over the past
century.241 Its landscape conservation design could be a proving ground for
reconstituting the on-the-ground “law of the land” in a manner less constrained by
ownership and jurisdictional boundaries. But that will require sustained engagement
by the federal government, which may yet revoke its support for this aspect of
resilience in legal action.
Resilience can contribute to structural environmental law reform. In addition to
the technocratic alterations necessary to promote adaptive management,242 resilience
should attend to the endogenous moral decisions about public actions or regulation.
But it is not an end in and of itself. Instead, resilience is a catalyst for achieving the
often implicit moral goals of environmental law.
CONCLUSION
Scholars will always debate how to best conceptualize environmental law. Every
generation will consider new ways to understand the world and discard older
frameworks that no longer map onto our aspirations or observations. Without the
benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to predict whether resilience will endure as
environmental law’s framework for mediating between governance and a changing

238. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, DOJ/ENRD Symposium on the Future of Environmental
Law, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,185, 10,198–99 (Mar. 2017).
239. See, e.g., WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 176; Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter,
The Realities of Regional Resource Management: Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors
Revisited, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (2006).
240. Jocelyn L. Aycrigg et al., Completing the System: Opportunities and Challenges for
a National Habitat Conservation System, 66 BIOSCIENCE 774, 775 (2016); Robert F. Baldwin,
Stephen C. Trombulak, Paul B. Leonard, Reed F. Noss, Jodi A. Hilty, Hugh P. Possingham,
Lynn Scarlett & Mark G. Anderson, The Future of Landscape Conservation, 68 BIOSCIENCE
60 (2018); Fischman et al., supra note 84, at 1001.
241. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & OHIO RIVER BASIN ALL., OHIO RIVER BASIN
—FORMULATING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION/ADAPTATION STRATEGIES THROUGH
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world. Environmental law scholarship on resilience over the past decade has
delivered important theoretical insights and extracted practical lessons from case
studies. This Article is an attempt to distill that work and apply it to the fundamental
questions of environmental law. Resilience and social-ecological systems
frameworks have already exerted some influence over environmental law. Resilience
modifies rather than replaces environmental law’s core principle of precaution
through process. Resilience is a property of our world. Nonetheless, it may serve as
a management aim for systems performing in an optimal fashion. Resilience delivers
better understanding of how caution operates in complex systems and provides
procedural tools. It allows for adaptation through experience and relieves governance
of the impossible task of ensuring all predictions are accurate before embarking on
management or regulation. But the more radical challenges of resilience to
environmental law are twofold.
First, resilience turns away from the futile search for certainty or finality in
systems essentially characterized by high variability and low predictability.
Environmental law often serves as our “law of the land” that translates ideas into onthe-ground practices. That translational function requires more candor and
experimentation in all environmental decisions. Adaptive management requires
softening our commitment to final agency actions and res judicata. Therefore,
adaptive management poses tremendous challenges for the enforceable substantive
standards so closely associated with the 1970s-era magisterial environmental statutes
and judicial interpretations of administrative safeguards. Crude rules of thumb, such
as bans on discharges without permits or prohibitions on jeopardizing endangered
species, must continue to play some role because our knowledge will always fall
short of understanding the full repercussions of actions in complex adaptive systems.
Burdens of proof in common law and administrative settings need root-to-branch
reassessment in light of the resilience framework. Conservation is restraint and thus
conservative. But it is not sustainability and should not foreclose transformation.
Resilient environmental law helps identify circumstances where stability is infeasible
or undesirable.
Second, resilience as a management goal offers a framework for confronting the
social drivers of unjust and inadequate outcomes of decades of environmental
management that excluded some people. To live deliberately requires we
contemplate distributive impacts as moral consequences. Environmental law must
blaze paths for social change. Power structures must yield to fairer ways of
provisioning social systems. During World War II, C.S. Lewis wrote that “[m]an’s
power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men
with Nature as its instrument.”243 Only the environmental justice strand of
environmental law has forthrightly dealt with this longstanding reality. With the echo
of Elinor Ostrom whispering in our ears,244 the legal response to environmental crises
must address the social dimension to environmental management, and it must be
experimental both spatially and temporally.
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